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This paper argues that de dicto reports of the form 'x  believes [that . . . .  [DetP the [NP . . .  ] ]  
. . . .  . ] '  are de re reports where the res i s  the individual concept which corresponds to 
' [DetP the [NP . . . ] ' .  This claim is based on the observation that definite descriptions 
project existence from complement clauses of attitude reports, even in those cases 
where the reporter and the bearer of the attitude do not have the same description "in 
mind. "  
1 .  Backgroun d :  Presupposition Proj ection i n  Attitude Reports 
( 1 )  illustrates the phenomenon of presupposition projection from complement clauses 
of certain attitude verbs .  The presupposition trigger is given in italics :  
( 1 )  a .  
b .  
c .  
Mary believes that Smith 's murderer escaped. 
(presupposition: there is a unique individual who murdered Smith. )  
Bill hopes that Mary bought cigarettes too.  
(presupposition : someone bought cigarettes . )  
John wants i t  to stop raining. 
(presupposition: it is raining. )  
The important thing to note about ( l )a is that it presupposes existence of a unique 
murderer, under both its de re and de dicto readings. The fact that the de re reading 
of ( l )a presupposes existence is expected and un surprising, because definite 
expressions trigger existence presuppositions in non-intensional contexts (e.g . ,  
Smith 's murderer escaped). But the fact that the de dicto reading presupposes 
existence of a unique murderer requires an explanation. 
As noted in the literature (e.g . ,  Karttunen ( 1 973 , 1 974» , the presuppositions 
of ( l )a-c can easily be cancelled : 
(2) a. 
b .  
c .  
Mary mistakenly believes that someone murdered Smith, and she 
believes that Smith' s murderer escaped. 
Bill is under the false impression that John bought cigarettes, and he 
hopes that Mary bought cigarettes too. 
John is under the false impression that it is raining, and he wants it to 
stop raining. 
The presuppositions need not, of course, be cancelled by explicitly stating that the 
subject of the attitude verb has false beliefs. A certain intonation, for example, may 
signal that the reporter does not presuppose what the complement clause 
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presupposes, even when ( 1  )a-c are uttered in isolation .  But generally, in isolation and 
with an unmarked intonation, ( 1  )a-c inherit the presuppositions of their complements. 
Two things require an explanation :  why presuppositions project from 
complement clauses, and why they are easily cancellable .  In order to account for the 
cancellability of the presuppositions of ( 1 ), Karttunen invokes the following two 
principles :  
(3 ) a .  If a is a non-factive verb of propositional attitude (e . g . ,  believe, think, 
expect, suspect, . . .  ), then a context c sati sfies the presuppositions of 
exa<l> only if Ba( c) satisfies the presuppositions of <1>; where B (c) 
stands for the set of beliefs attributed to ex in c .  
b .  Context c sati sfies the presuppositions of "<I> and ljT" just in case 
(i) c sati sfies the presupposition of <1>, and 
(ii) the context that results from c by the assertion of <I> satisfies 
the presupposition of ljT .  
According to (3) ,  ( 1 )a does not presuppose that someone murdered Smith. It 
presupposes that Mary believes that someone murdered Smith . Likewise, ( 1 )b 
presupposes that Bill believes that someone bought cigarettes, and ( 1 )c presupposes 
that John believes that it is raining. Thus, (3) correctly predicts that (2)a-c presuppose 
nothing at all : in each case, the first conjunct results in a context where the subject is 
attributed some belief (in ( 1 )a, the belief that someone murdered S mith) . This  derived 
context satisfies the presuppositions of the second conjunct (see also Heim ( 1 992» . 
But now we are left with the following puzzle :  If ( 1  )a-c do  not presuppose 
what their complement clauses presuppose (but only that the bearer of the attitude 
presupposes what the complement clause presupposes), why do we have the intuition 
that each of the examples in ( 1 ), taken as a whole, has the same presupposition as its 
complement clause? 
Karttunen' s answer is this : without evidence to the contrary, the hearer tends 
to assume that the reporter and the subject of the attitude verb share their 
presuppositions. For example, upon hearing ( 1 )a we infer by (3 )a  that Mary 
presupposes the existence of a unique individual who murdered Smith. If the context 
does not indicate otherwise, by a default conversational principle, we also assume that 
the reporter attributes to Mary the same presuppositions that she herself has. 
Heim ( 1 992) suggests that Karttunen's  default principle can be seen as part 
ofa general approach to presupposition accommodation (e .g . ,  Soames ( 1 982, 1 989» . 
The intuition behind this approach (see also Beaver ( 1 995» is that i t  i s  unreasonable 
for a speaker to expect her audience to accept, as part of the conversational 
background, presuppositions that are controversial or surprising . S o  upon hearing 
( l )a out of the blue, we infer by (3 )a that Mary presupposes what the complement 
presupposes .  We also tend to assume that the reporter takes this to be 
uncontroversial, and the reason why she takes this to be uncontroversial i s  that it is 
a reasonable thing for Mary to believe. Given no evidence to the contrary, we tend to 
assume that Mary's presupposition is reasonable precisely because it i s  entailed by the 
context. 
INDIVIDUAL CONCEPTS AND ATTITUDE REpORTS 
In the next section I will show that some cases of existence presupposition 
projection in transparent attitude reports may be problematic for the KarttunenlHeim 
theory of projection and cancellation. To solve the problem, I will propose a de re 
analysis of de dicto reports, which maintains the spirit of this theory .  
2. Transparent Reports 
The discourse in (4) contains a belief report, where the reporter (Bill) replaces the 
subject' s (John' s) description with his own description :  
(4) John : "Mary looks too happy these days. It seems to me that she has a lover. 
I don't know who he is, I have never seen him, but I think her lover 
is  a fool ."  
Bill : "John believes that Smith ' s  murderer i s  a fool . "  
One plausible way to  make sense of  (4) i s  t o  infer that B ill believes that Smith has 
been murdered, and furthermore, he believes that Smith ' s  murderer is Mary ' s  lover. 
John does not necessarily believe that Smith has been murdered. Also, he does not 
know who Mary' s 10verlBill' s  murderer is, and he does not (necessarily) believe that 
Mary ' s  lover is  Smith's  murderer. Nevertheless, we accept Bill ' s  report as a true 
report, and we infer that (from Bill ' s  point of view) there is a unique murderer. 
Examples similar to (4) are discussed in Kaplan ( 1 977), Fodor ( 1 979), and 
Bonomi ( 1 995) .  As pointed out by Bonomi, (4)-type reports are neither de dicto 
reports nor "regular" de re reports. For example, if Bill ' s  report in (4) were a de dicto 
report, it would imply that John says to himself: "Smith' s murderer i s  a fool . "  If it 
were a "regular" de re report, it would imply that John has an epistemic 
characterization of Smith' s  actual murderer (without necessarily knowing that he is 
Smith' s murderer), whom he believes to be a fool. But the reading we are considering 
does not imply either the former or the latter. B onomi argues that these cases are de 
re reports of a special sort .  For example in (4), ' Smith' s murderer' i s  interpreted 
outside the attitude context, and denotes the individual who is Smith' s  murderer in the 
believing world .  However, unlike "regular" de re reports, here the subject of the 
attitude verb is not necessarily acquainted with the res - the individual denoted by the 
definite expression. Let us call this analysis pseudo de re (to borrow Kaplan ' s ( 1 977) 
term) . Within this approach, both "regular" de re and pseudo de re reports involve 
interpreting the definite expression outside the attitude context . The difference 
between them lies in the way the subject relates to the individual that expression 
denotes .  
Fodor ( 1 979), on the other hand, argues that these are de dicto reports of 
some sort, where the reporter and the subject of the attitude verb do not have the 
same description "in mind" . 1 She argues that (4) illustrates a more general 
phenomenon of transparency. In general, attitude reports of the form 'y  
believes/wants/hopes [ . . .  [Det Pl . . ] ' ,  may give rise to  a reading where 'P ' i s  
transparent (i . e. ,  interpreted outside the attitude context), but the report is  not 
"about" an individual which corresponds to [Det P] in the world where the believing 
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takes place. Rather, it is more like a de dicta report .  This is perhaps most clear in the 
case of reports involving indefinites (see Section 2 . 3 ) .  But I will be concerned mostly 
with definites, and will try to defend Fodor' s view that definites, too, give rise to such 
readings, and that (4) is a relevant example .  
Now, if transparent description reports such as (4) are pseudo de re, and the 
definite expression denotes an individual in the actual world, then there i s  nothing 
surprising about the fact that the whole sentence presupposes existence (e .g . ,  the 
existence of a murderer in Bill ' s  report above) . Consequently, the general theory of 
cancellation and projection sketched in Section 1 requires no modification .  Support 
for thi s analysis comes from the fact that the presupposition of Bill ' s report is not 
cancellable. For example, the second conjunct in John mistakenly believes that Mary 
has a lover, and he believes Smith 's murderer to be a fool, cannot be  understood as 
a transparent report, where Smith 's murderer replaces MalY 's lover. This  seems to 
indicate that Smith 's murderer in Bi ll ' s  report in (4) is interpreted as Smith' s  actual 
murderer. 
However, if a case could be made in favor of Fodor' s view that these are in 
fact de dicta reports of some sort, the fact that the whole sentence presupposes 
existence would require an explanation. For one thing, we would have to explain why 
in (4), unlike ( l )a, the subject does not presuppose what the complement 
presupposes :  only Bil l  believes in the existence of a murderer, John need not. This 
conflicts with (3 )a. Secondly, we would have to explain why the presupposition of 
( l )a is cancellable, whereas that of (4) is  not. 
Despite this difficulty, I will argue, with Fodor, that Bill ' s  report in (4) is  a de 
dicta report of some sort. More accurately, it is a de re report where the res i s  an 
individual concept. We will see that the proposed analysis does not conflict with (3)a. 
2. 1 The issue of the acquaintance relation 
Perhaps the most obvious problem with a pseudo de re analysis of the report in (4) 
is that "regular" de re belief reports are intuitively understood as beliefs "about" the 
individual denoted by the definite expression outside the attitude context . This  does 
not seem to be the case in (4), since John is not acquainted with Smith' s  
murdererlMary' s lover, and therefore his belief does not seem to b e  "about" Smith' s  
actual murderer (or Mary' s actual lover) . This raises the question o f  whether we can 
claim at all that the definite expression in (4) is interpreted outside the attitude 
context. Let us look at this problem more closely. 
According to the de re belief theory of Quine ( 1 956)-Kaplan ( 1 969)-Lewis 
( 1979)-Cresswell & von Stechow ( 1 982), a de re belief is an ascription of a property 
to an individual .  For example, John believes that Mary is a spy, is understood to 
mean the following : 
(5) John ascribes to Mary the ' spy' property. 
Mmy and is a spy are both arguments of believe . This analysis accounts for the fact 
that we can report de re beliefs involving mistaken identity. For example, John may 
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see Mal)' on two different occasions, and believe that the individual he saw on the first 
occasion is a spy, while the individual he saw on the second occasion is  not a spy. 
Both of these beliefs can be reported as beliefs about Mal)' (John believes that MalY 
is a spy and John believes that Mal)) is not a spy) . But John does not hold 
contradictol)' beliefs - he simply fails to recognize that the two individuals he saw on 
the two different occasions are one and the same. 
The truth of (5), then, depends on the relation which holds uniquely between 
the res (Mal)') and John - the subject of believe . This relation picks out Mary in the 
actual world-time pair, but need not pick her out in those world-time pairs where John 
believes himself to be. In other words, (5) is true in the actual world-time pair iff the 
following holds : 2 
(6) There exists a relation D such that 
a. Mal)' is the unique individual who John bears D to in the actual world­
time pair; and 
b .  John self-ascribes in  the actual world-time pair the property C, where 
C is that property such that for any individual a, world 0 and interval 
(time) r, C(a)(o)(r) is true iff the unique individual that a bears D to 
in 0 at r is a spy in 0 at r.  
(Roughly: In those world-time pairs where John believes himself to be, 
the individual John believes himself to be bears D uniquely to an 
individual who is a spy . )  
By assumption, D must be  a suitable relation of  acquaintance (see Kaplan ( 1 969) and 
Lewis ( 1 979» , which "puts the believer in cognitive contact" (Cresswell & von 
Stechow ( 1 982), p. 509) with the res. An example of such a relation (of type 
<e,<e,<s,<i,t» » ) is the following : 
(7) AXAYAwAt[glimpse-in-a-red-hat' (y,x)(w)(t)] 
So John can be reported to believe of Mal)', under one acquaintance relation, that she 
is a spy, and under another acquaintance relation, that she is not. 
The requirement that the relation D (in the de re schema corresponding to (6» 
be a relation of acquaintance relates to the problem of transparent reports in the 
following way. Suppose no restrictions whatsoever are imposed on D, and we do not 
require it to be a relation which implies acquaintance of the res on the part of the 
believer. We then get the undesired result that if it is true that Mary is the shortest 
spy, and it is true that John believes that the shortest spy is a spy, then ' John believes 
Mal)' is a spy' is true (see Kaplan ( 1 969» . So D has to be appropriately constrained 
in order to disallow this inference. The standard way to constrain D is to require it to 
be a relation of acquaintance ((7), which implies cognitive contact between the 
believer and the res, is  a good candidate) . 
In view of this, let us consider again the proposal that (4)-type reports are de 
re reports of some sort. Under the relevant reading of (4), we do not understand B ill ' s  
report as implying that John says t o  himself something like: "the guy I see wearing a 
237 
238 Yael Sharvit 
red hat is a fool", because there is no contact between John and Mary ' s  lover/Smith ' s  
murderer. It i s  more likely that we understand Bill ' s  report as implying that John says 
to himself: "Mary' s lover is a fool ."  So if we are to analyze (4)-type reports as pseudo 
de re reports, where the res i s  the individual denoted by the definite expression 
outside the attitude context, we will need to allow D the freedom to be a relation 
which is not necessarily a relation of acquaintance. Bonomi ( 1 995), in fact, endorses 
the view that (4 )-type reports are de re reports where the usual requirements on the 
relation between the believer and the res are not met .  But if this is so, how do we 
block the "shortest spy" inference? 
As pointed out to me by Irene Heim, the fact that the "shortest spy" inference 
is blocked certainly suggests that D needs to be constrained . But perhaps there is a 
way to relax the constraints on D in such a way that it would still be constrained 
enough to block the "shortest spy" inference, but unconstrained enough to support 
the truth of transparent reports of the (4)-type. Another possibility to consider i s  that 
the "shortest spy" inference is  blocked by independent factors. If a solution along 
these lines is possible, the implication would be that transparent reports of the (4)­
type can be analyzed as reports about individuals, and do not pose a problem for the 
theory of presupposition projection and cancellation sketched in Section 1 .  
An alternative way to account for (4)-type reports i s  to adopt some version 
of Fodor' s ( 1 979) approach, and to say that they are de dicto reports of some sort. 
This would enable us to maintain the standard solution to the "shortest spy" problem: 
the relation between the believer and the res must be a suitable  relation of 
acquaintance, which implies contact between the believer and the res. This type of 
solution may require of us to rethink presupposition projection and cancellation. 
The exi stence of transparent reports of the (4)-type suggests to me that as 
argued in Cresswell & von Stechow ( 1 982), de re beliefs need not be only about 
individuals .  If we allow the res the freedom to be of any semantic type, we can 
analyze de dicto reports in general as de re reports .  This analysis would cover (4)­
type reports as well . So rather than relax the constraints on the relation between the 
subject and the res, I argue that (4)-type reports are de re reports where the res i s  an 
individual concept . I will show that this general approach to transparent reports 
applies to a variety of cases, beyond the (4)-type. We now turn to these.  
2. 2 Transparent 'role ' expressions 
While not all definite expressions project existence, all definite expressions support 
transparent reports similar to (4) . As observed by Fodor, expressions which refer to 
posts or positions (e.g . ,  the captain of the cricket team, the king of Morocco, etc . )  
and expressions containing superlative adjectives (e .g . ,  the best student in the class, 
the smartest girl in the room, etc. ), unlike "regular" definite expressions (e .g . , the 
man I SalV yesterday), do not project existence from attitude contexts : 
(8) a. 
b .  
John believes that the king of Morocco was assassinated . 
John wants to meet the smartest girl in the class. 
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When uttered out of the blue, without any explicit indication as to whether the 
reporter accepts or rejects the presuppositions of the complement, the tendency is not 
to infer that Morocco has a king (or that there is exactly one girl such that all the 
others are less smart than her) . In this respect, (8)a-b contrast with ( l )a, which, when 
uttered out of the blue, creates the impression that the reporter believes in the 
existence of a (unique) murderer. I will call the two kinds of expressions illustrated 
in (8) ' role' expressions . 
One might argue that the contrast between (8) and ( 1 )a is not as strong as 
Fodor claims it to be. It is certainly not as strong for all native speakers . But the 
interesting thing about 'role' expressions is that they support transparent belief reports 
which cannot be analyzed as pseudo de re (at least not straightforwardly) . Consider 
the following case (not discussed by Fodor) . John is a new student at Bill ' s  school .  
Bill knows that in their school, as a rule, every year the best student is  appointed the 
class treasurer. John is unaware of this. Based on some rumors that he has heard, John 
says: "usually, the class treasurer receives an award." John can say this to mean either: 
'usually! [the-class-treasurer(t) receives an award in t] ' (where 'the class treasurer' 
contains a variable bound by 'usually'), or 'usually! [the-class-treasurer(tJ receives 
an award in t] ' (where 'the class treasurer' refers to a particular individual) . Bill can 
truthfully report both these beliefs as follows : 
(9) John believes that usually, the best student receives an award. 
Neither reading can be analyzed as a "regular" de dicto report (because neither 
reading implies that John says to himself: "usually, the best student receives an 
award"). In addition, the first reading (where the content of John ' s  belief is 'usually! 
[the-class-treasurer(t) receives an award in t] ' )  cannot be a report about an existing 
best student, because John ' s  belief is about a role, not about a person.  Neither John 
nor Bill need presuppose the existence of a unique best student/class treasurer. The 
second reading (where the content of John ' s  belief is 'usually! [the-class-treasurer( tJ 
receives an award in t] ') cannot be analyzed as a belief about an existing best student 
either, at least for those informants who treat ' role' expressions as not projecting 
existence. These informants understand (9) not to presuppose existence of a unique 
best student. 
It seems, then, that (9) is some kind of a de dicto report . More accurately, it 
seems to require a de re analysis where the res can be intensional . This is completely 
independent of the question of how presuppositions of ' non-role '  expressions are 
projected. If (9)-type reports are indeed de dicto reports of some kind, it is not at all 
clear that (4)-type reports should be reduced to pseudo de re, where the res is 
"extensional", and not to de dicto, on a par with (9) . 
2. 3 Transparent indefinites 
Indefinites illustrate most clearly the phenomenon of transparency. Let us first 
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consider the familiar de re/de dicta contrast, illustrated by the translations ( 1 0)b and 
( 10)c of ( 1 0)a (the translation in ( l O)b follows the de re pattern discussed in 2 . 1 ) :  
( 1 0) a .  
b .  
c .  
John believes that some member o f  the local soccer team has a dog. 
:3x[member-soccer' (x)(w)(t) & believe 'G ,  x, AYAW' At ' [has-a­
dog' (y)(w')(t' )])(w)(t)] 
believe 'G ,  AW'At' :3x[member-soccer' (x)(w')(t ' )  & has-a-
dog' (x)(w')(t')] (w)(t) 
Now consider the following scenario (based on an example from Bonomi ( 1 995)) .  
John sees a dog tied to a tree outside a restaurant. He goes in and notices that one 
table is occupied by a group of people. Bill, but not John, knows that these people are 
the members of the local soccer team. John mutters to himself "one of these people 
has a dog" (thinking that one of them is the owner of the dog he just saw) . B ill can 
then truthfully report John' s belief by uttering ( 1 0)a. But this reading does not 
correspond either to ( 1 0)b (because John does not know which one of the people he 
sees is the dog owner) or to ( lO)c (because Bill ' s  report does not imply that John says 
to himself "some member of the local soccer team has a dog") .  Rather, it seems that 
the reading we are after should be informally represented as follows : 
( 1 1 )  believe 'G ,  
AW' At' :3x[member-soccer' (x)(w)(t) & has-a-dog' (x)(w')(t ' )])(w)(t) 
( 1 1 )  resembles ( lO)b in that the predicate - ' member of the local soccer team' - is the 
reporter' s, not John' s, and its world and time arguments are co-indexed with the 
world and time arguments of 'believe' . But in ( 1 1 ), as opposed to ( l O)b, the 
existential quantifier which binds the individual variable is inside the belief context, not 
outside it : John cannot point at one individual of which he suspects to be the dog 
owner. So ( 1 0)-( 1 1 )  illustrate the fact that the transparency of the predicate is 
independent of whether the existential quantifier is inside or outside the attitude 
context (see Fodor ( 1 979), Bonomi ( 1 995), Kratzer ( 1 997), and Chierchia ( 1 997)), 
among others, for more discussion) . 
But the transparent predicate need not always correspond to an individual or 
a set of individuals that satisfy it in the believing world-time pair. To see this, consider 
the following case. Bill knows that every year as a rule, all and only the A-students 
get to go on a free trip to Paris .  So as far as he is concerned, being an A-student 
means being on the Paris-list . He also knows that this year nobody got any grade 
above C, and as a result, no one is on the Paris-list. Mary is unaware of the fact that 
being on the Paris-list requires being an A-student. She is also unaware of the fact that 
no one is planned to go to Paris this year. She says to Bill : "Some student who is on 
the Paris-list was at the store today ."  Bill can truthfully report Mary' s belief as 
follows : 
( 1 2) Mary believes that some A-student was at the store today .  
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The transparent predicate (' A-student') does not refer either to a set of individuals (cf. 
( 1 1 »  or to an individual (cf. ( 1 0)b), because as far as Bill is concerned, there are 
currently no A-students at all . The theory of transparent reports should assign ( 1 2) 
an interpretation where the existential quantifier binding the individual variable is 
inside the attitude context (as in ( 1 1 » , and the predicate, which is outside the attitude 
context, is  understood intensionally. In short, ( 1 2) looks more like a "regular" de 
dicto report, but for the fact that the predicate is the reporter' s, not the subj ect ' s (i . e . ,  
we  do  not conclude that Mary says to  herself: "some A-student was at the store 
today"). 
This example, like (9), justifies a de re theory which allows the res to be 
something other than an individual like ' John' and 'Mary' . The question is, What are 
the constraints, if any, that are imposed on the semantic type of the res? What we 
think about the constraints on the res relates to what we think about the constraints 
on the relation D (in the de re schema corresponding to (6» which holds between the 
believer and the res, and ultimately, it determines how we analyze transparent reports 
of the (4)-type .  
Ifwe require D to be a relation of "strict" acquaintance, and also require the 
res to be of type 'e ' ,  we cannot account for the transparency in either (4), (9) or ( 1 2) .  
Ifwe can relax the constraints on  D enough to support the truth of  transparent 
reports of the (4)-type (and avoid the "shortest spy" problem at the same time), we 
can analyze (4) as a de re report, whose res is just the actual murderer. This would 
be consistent with saying that the res must be of type 'e ' . If we adopt this view, one 
way to account for ( 1 2) would perhaps be to say that the res is  the kind which 
corresponds to the property 'being an A-student' . We could also say, perhaps, that 
' roles' also have kind counterparts (this would account for (9» , but ' non-roles ' ,  such 
as Smith 's murderer or the man I met this morning do not . In short, under this kind 
of approach, we would distinguish between (4)-type reports on the one hand and 
( 12)- and (9)- reports on the other as follows : the former are pseudo de re, the latter 
are, in some special sense, de dicto . 
The third possibility is to relax the constraints on D, allow the res to be of any 
semantic type, and still claim that transparent reports of the (4)-type are pseudo de re o 
Proponents of such a theory would have to show why (4)-type reports cannot "take 
advantage" of the fact that the res can be of a higher type. 
The fourth view, the one I am adopting, is that D must be a relation of 
acquaintance, and the res can be of any semantic type .  This preserves the standard 
solution to the "shortest spy" problem. It also opens the door for interpreting (4)-type 
and ( 1 2)- and (9)-type reports alike as de re reports with an "intensional" res. 
3. A De Re Approach to De Dicto Reports 
3. 1 Acquaintance with properties and concepts 
How can we account for de re attitude reports illustrated in (4), (9), and ( 1 2)? It is 
not enough to take the description out of the intensional context. We have to 
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guarantee that the subject may have a different description "in mind. "  Adopting ideas 
from Heim (1992) and Kratzer ( 1 997), I will use the acquaintance relation to express 
the fact that the subject ' s  description may differ from that of the reporter' s .  Since 
Heim' s implementation of this idea relates to the issue of presupposition projection, 
and to whether certain de dicto reports can be reduced to de re reports, let us explore 
it in some detail . 
Recall that according to Karttunen ( 1 973 , 1 974), presupposition projection 
from complement clauses of certain attitude verbs is the result of (3)a coupled with 
a default principle. According to this principle, given no evidence to the contrary, we 
tend to guess that the reporter and the subject share their presuppositions, as seems 
to be the case in ( l )a-c. Heim ( 1 992) considers two different accounts for the fact that 
in isolation, the matrix inherits the presuppositions of the complement. One of them 
is essentially Karttunen' s suggested default principle of projection. The alternative 
account says that the preferred reading of out-of-the-blue reports is the "regular" de 
re reading. Heim later raises some doubts regarding the plausibility of the de re 
account, and in the end leaves it as an open question which of the two approaches is 
the right one. I agree that the de re account as outlined in Heim ( 1 992) is  problematic, 
but one of its main ideas is useful in that it enables us to account for transparency 
effects. 
That version of the de re theory of presupposition projection is essentially this .  
When faced with an isolated attitude report involving a definite expression, and 
without sufficient evidence to motivate a de dicto interpretation, the hearer tends to 
interpret it as a de re report (where the res is just the individual denoted by the 
definite expression outside the attitude context) . This is why the whole sentence 
presupposes existence .  For example, ( l )a (Mary believes that Smith 's murderer 
escaped) is a de re report about Smith' s actual murderer, which may look like a de 
dicto report. It presupposes existence of a unique murderer, just like the b are sentence 
Smith 's murderer escaped presupposes existence of a unique murderer. 
But what reason do we have to assume that the preferred reading is always (or 
mostly) de re? Heim points out that in many cases de re and de dicto readings are very 
hard to distinguish from one another. Consider, for example, John believes that his 
dog is sick. In a normal situation, where we have no reason to believe that John does 
not recognize his dog as his dog, it is hard to tell whether we understand the sentence 
to mean that in all the worlds in which John believes himself to be, the individual that 
satisfies the description "John' s dog" in those worlds is sick (the de dicto reading); 
or that in all the worlds in which John believes himself to be the individual which 
satisfies the description "John' s dog" in the actual world, and whom John recognizes 
as his dog, is sick (a possible de re reading) . 
This observation is related to Fodor' s claim that an individual can be reported 
to have a de re belief with or without "agreeing" with the reporter about the 
description of the res. In our example, it is plausible to assume that given no reason 
to think otherwise, we tend to think that John has a de re belief about his dog, while 
being aware that his dog is, in fact, his dog. So the source of the presupposition 
"projection" here is this :  if the context does not give us evidence to the contrary, we 
tend to interpret attitude reports of this sort de re, and assume that the subject accepts 
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the reporter' s description. 
This yields a de re reading which is very close to the de dicto reading. If we 
assume that the acquaintance relation which holds between the subject and the res is 
given by the context,3 one of the readings may imply that the subject is aware of the 
description used by the reporter. In this case, de re entails de dicto . For example, in 
a context c where the acquaintance relation is something like ' . . . .  y is aware in w at 
t that x is y' s dog ' ,  then the de re and de dicto readings of John believes his dog is 
sick are indeed hard to distinguish : 
( 1 3) a .  
b .  
de re : 
(i) W s-dog' (w)(t) = tx[RG, x)(w)(t)] ]g(C) ; and 
(ii) John self-ascribes in [w]g(C) at [t]g(C) 
[AYAw'At' [sick' (tx[R(y, x)(w' )(t ') ])(w')(t' )] ]g(C) 
de dicto : John self-ascribes in [w]g(C) at [t]g(C) 
[AYAW'At' [sick' (y' s-dog' (w')(t ' » (w')(t ' )] ]g(c) 
In short, according to this approach, if the context does not give us reasons to believe 
otherwise, we go for the interpretation in ( 1 3)a rather than ( 1 3 )b, with an 
acquaintance relation which implies that the subject ' s  description and the reporter' s 
description are very close. 
Heim mentions several problems with this kind of solution. For example, the 
solution would have to be extended to other presupposition triggers (also, stop, etc . ) . 4 
It is not clear that this can always be done. In addition, it is  not clear that indeed the 
de re reading is always (or even usually) preferred over the de dicto reading. 
Independently of these problems, if the argument discussed in Section 2 concerning 
the acquaintance relation is valid, and a pseudo de re analysis of (4)-type reports is 
problematic, then this de re account does not cover all cases of presupposition 
projection (especially since (4) is a case where the subject is not necessarily aware of 
the reporter' s description) . 
But the assumption that the information about the subject ' s  and the reporter' s 
different descriptions is encoded in the acquaintance relation accounts for 
transparency, in the sense that the description can always be seen as given from the 
reporter' s point of view. I propose, then, that de dicto reports are always de re 
reports with an intensional res, regardless of whether or not the reporter and the 
subject have the same description "in mind."  In particular, in (4) and (9) the res is an 
individual concept; in ( 1 2) the res is a property. The acquaintance relation which 
holds between the subject and the property/concept determines whether the subject 
and the reporter have the same opinion regarding their descriptive content .  
The first part of the proposal i s  inspired by Cresswell & von Stechow' s  ( 1 982) 
treatment of mathematical beliefs. As they point out, John believes that 59 is 59 may 
be true even if John does not believe that 59 is prime. Under their analysis, the 
sentence asserts that John knows of ' 59' and of the property 'being 59 '  that the latter 
holds of the former. This is possible if John is acquainted with ' 5 9' and with the 
property 'being 59' .  The acquaintance relation may be something like 'P is represented 
for x by the predicate expression '=59' . '  It does not follow that John believes of ' 59 '  
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and of 'PRIME' (the property of being prime) that the latter holds of the former. 
This sort of analysis is based on the assumption that we can report beliefs 
about properties. It is independently supported by cases such as the following. Mary 
may say, after seeing John at the store : "John is a PR student ."  Suppose Bill knows 
that being a PR student requires being a member of the soccer team (if you are one, 
you are the other) . He can then report Mary' s belief substituting "her" property for 
"his" : "Mary believes that John is a member of the soccer team" (i . e . ,  Mary believes 
of , MEMBER-OF-THE-SOCCER-TEAM' that it holds of John) . Similarly, in ( 1 2) 
(repeated in ( I4)a), 'A-STUDENT' is the res: 
( 1 4) a .  
b .  
Mary believes(w)(t) that some A-student was at the store. 
(i) 'A-STUDENT' is [tP �,<SAt>>>[R3 (m, P)(w)(t)] ]g(C); 
(ii) Mary self-ascribes in [w]g(C) at [t]g(C) 
P"YAW'At' :3X[tP [R3 (y, P)(w')(t ') ](x)(w')(t ' )  & was-at-the­
store' (x)(w')(t ')] ]g(C) 
( I4)b does not entail the existence of any A-students in the believing world-time pair. 
The value of R3 may or may not imply that Mary uses the same predicate as the 
reporter. In the situation described in Section 2 . 3 ,  the acquaintance relation most 
probably implies that Mary' s predicate is something else. 
Turning to definite descriptions, consider again John believes that Smith 's 
murderer is a fool. Whether it is uttered out of the blue, or against the context in (4), 
the res is ' SMITH' S MURDERER' ,  which maps every world in its domain to the 
unique murderer of Smith in that world :  5 
( 1 5) a. 
b. 
' SMITH' S-MURDERER' is [tf<s,e>[RI OG ,f)(w)(t)] ]g(C) ; 
John self-ascribes in [w]g(C) at [t]g(c) 
[AY AW' At' [fool' (tQRI O(y,f)( w' )(t ' ) ] (w'» ( w')( t ' )] ]g(C) 
RIO  picks out a unique function in the believing world-time pair, which may or may 
not imply that John has the reporter' s  description in mind. Notice that in both cases, 
the description is the reporter' s .  But depending on RIO, it may or may not be 
"exclusively" the reporter' s .  
3. 2 Back to presupposition projection 
We have shown how the "de dicto as de re" approach takes care of transparency. 
What we have not yet explained is how and why presuppositions project from attitude 
contexts. 
I would like to propose that the KarttunenlHeim theory of cancellation and 
projection, as sketched in Section 1 ,  is essentially correct. The subject presupposes 
what the complement presupposes, and sometimes, if the context allows it, we assume 
that the subject and the reporter share their presuppositions. However, the reporter' s 
description is not always shared by the subject - it may be a "replaced" description. 
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So at least in the case of embedded definite descriptions, before deciding what the 
presuppositions of the complement and of the whole sentence are, the hearer must 
decide what the acquaintance relation is .  More specifically, the hearer has to decide 
whether the description is exclusively the reporter' s . The acquaintance relation itself 
may be a source for certain presuppositions. 
Let us assume that if the context does not indicate otherwise, we tend to 
assume that the acquaintance relation picks out similar functions for the subject and 
the reporter. So when John believes Smith 's murderer is a fool is uttered out of the 
blue, the hearer assumes that in those world-time pairs where John believes himself 
to be, R I O  (in ( 1 5)) picks out some function which selects a unique murderer of 
Smith in those worlds for which it is defined (it need not be ' SMITH' S MURDERER' 
itself). By (3)a, the hearer infers that John presupposes that a murderer exists . By the 
default principle discussed in section 1, the hearer further guesses that this is a shared 
presupposition. The presupposition is "cancelled" when this default principle is 
inapplicable. 
If the same sentence is uttered against a background where John has said :  
"Mary' s lover is a fool", and we know that the reporter thinks that Mary' s lover is 
Smith' s murderer, we tend to guess that RIO  is something like the following ( 'f has 
to be a member of the set of relevant "natural" functions, which is  given by the 
context) : 6 
( 1 6) AfAYAwAt[f{w)=m's-lover' (w) & . . .  & fwas(w)(t) known to y as the function 
with such-and-such properties] 
The hearer knows that according to the reporter, Smith' s murderer is  Mary' s lover. 
So according to ( I 5)a, RIO picks out ' SMITH' S-MURDERER' in the actual world­
time pair. According to ( I 5)b, in each of the world-time pairs which John believes 
himself to be, the "natural" function picked out by RIO happens to yield the individual 
who is Mary' s lover. 
In sum, the work that RI O does is this :  (a) it gives the reporter' s  perspective 
(i . e . ,  the fact that the murderer is Mary' s lover); and (b) it guarantees that in all the 
world-time pairs the subject believes himself to be, Mary' s lover is a fool (but see 
Note #6) . So even though the subject need not presuppose that Smith has been 
murdered, the whole sentence does. 
Notice that we predict this presupposition not to be easily cancellable. The 
reason is that it is not "inherited" due to some default conversational principle, but 
rather comes from an already existing presupposition - that Smith' s murderer is 
Mary's lover. If the sentence is uttered against a background where the reporter has 
not explicitly asserted that Smith' s murderer is Mary' s lover, but still "replaces" the 
description (as is the situation in (4)), we assume that he must have a good reason to 
replace the description. One plausible reason is that he knows Smith' s  murderer is 
Mary' s lover, and that the acquaintance relation is something like ( 1 6) .  
Now compare this to (9) (under the reading John believes that usuallYt the 
best student(t) receives an award in t), where the definite is a ' role' expression .  
'BEST-STUDENT' (of type <s,<i,e» ) i s  the res. There is no  source for any 
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existence presupposition here. For one thing, the subject does not presuppose 
existence of anything (whether or not he shares the description with the reporter) . 
This is because 'the best student' does not refer. So there is no presupposition which 
could "percolate", by any conversational principle. On the other hand, if we know that 
the reporter believes that in the actual world, whenever there is a best student there 
is a unique class treasurer, the acquaintance relation will contain this information. But 
this does not imply that the reporter believes in the existence of an actual best student 
in the reporting time. Notice that because Smith 's murderer is not a ' role' expression, 
a similar interpretation is not available for John believes that Smith 's murderer is a 
fool. 
If the complement contains a ' role' expression, and the subject does 
presuppose existence by (3)a (e.g . ,  John believes that the king of Morocco got 
married), we will reason in the same way we reason for ' non-role '  expressions in out­
of-the-blue contexts, but we sometimes also take into account the possibility that the 
reporter and the subject do not share all their presuppositions. For example, the 
hearer may consider the possibility that the reporter believes that Morocco is a 
monarchy. This suffices to justifY attributing to John the belief that Morocco currently 
has a king. But the hearer may also consider the possibility that the current 
circumstances in Morocco are not normal, and temporarily, there is no king. 
Final ly, notice that not all definite descriptions come with a label which 
decides once and for all whether they are 'role' expressions. Many times, the decision 
whether to understand a definite expression as a ' role' expression or not relies on the 
context. Some expressions lend themselves more easily to a role-interpretation than 
others . For example, we tend to interpret the student who failed the final exam not 
as a ' role' expression (and indeed, this expression usually projects existence from 
attitude contexts). But it is much easier to interpret the students who failed the exam 
(where the head is in the plural form) as a 'role' ,  since it is plausible that normal years 
in that class are characterized by the fact that several people fail the final exam. 
4. Summary 
In this paper I showed why some transparent attitude reports may pose a problem for 
the KarttunenlHeim theory of presupposition projection and cancellation .  Taking the 
position that the relation which holds between the bearer of the attitude and the res 
must be a relation of acquaintance, I proposed a "de dicto as de re" analysis of these 
transparent reports, which preserves the spirit of the theory of presupposition 
projection and cancellation. It remains to be seen whether this theory has significant 
implications regarding other presupposition triggers besides definite descriptions. 
Endnotes 
* I am indebted to Irene Heim for her comments on an earlier draft, especially for 
pointing out problems pertaining to transparent reports. I am also grateful to Robin 
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Clark, Veneeta Dayal, Gerhard Jager, Laun Karttunen, Angelika Kratzer, Fred 
Landman, and Maribel Romero for their comments on different aspects of the paper; 
and to the SAL T8 audience . All errors are of course my own. 
1 The different terminology used in Fodor ( 1 979) is of no significance to the current 
discussion. 
2 This formulation is based on Lewis ( 1979), according to which beliefs are properties 
self-ascribed, and Cresswell & von Stechow ( 1 982) . 
3 This is also the position taken in von Stechow ( 1 984) and in Abusch ( 1 997) . 
4 Heim attempts a de re analysis of also, which accounts for the transparent use of 
also in, e .g . ,  my parents think that I am also in bed. Here, it is the property of ' also 
being in bed' (where ' also '  implies that someone else is in bed) which is interpreted 
outside the attitude context. 
5 ' Smith 's  murderer' may contain a time argument (e.g . ,  the time of the murder), 
which may also be interpreted de re (see Abusch ( 1 997) and Ogihara ( 1 996» for 
discussion of temporal de re reports) . This means that the function which is 
interpreted outside the belief context is of type <i, <s, e> > .  Of course, ' Smith' can also 
be interpreted de re independently, in which case the function which is interpreted 
outside the belief context is of type <e,<s,e» (or <e,<i,<s,e» » .  
6 'Mary' s lover' may have a temporal argument too, which, depending on whether we 
construe this expression as a 'role' expression, may or may not be a variable bound 
by the same lambda which binds the temporal argument of was known. In addition, 
RIO may also contain another acquaintance relation, which the subject bears, e .g . ,  to 
Mary. 
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